Showing posts with label AI. Show all posts
Showing posts with label AI. Show all posts

Sunday, May 21, 2017

Insurgence, by Ken MacLeod

Ken MacLeod's The Corporation Wars: Insurgence, is the second book of a trilogy. It (along with the first book in the series, Dissidence, is a finalist for the Prometheus award this year.

Insurgence continues the story of awakened robots struggling for freedom, and uploaded human ex-combatants fighting to retake the planetary system the robots had been mining and exploring.

This installment focuses less on the robots' claim to be agents worthy of separate respect, and more on the uploaded warriors struggle to figure out the nature of the reality they inhabit while mostly following orders to fight the battles their supervisors are pursuing. Their ultimate worry is that they don't have enough information to tell which side they're fighting on or who they are battling to subdue. When you live in a simulation (particularly when you can tell that someone else has access to the control panel) it's a little difficult to be sure that your choices aren't effectively controlled by someone else.

Next, cracks appear in the simulation, and "real" revived people see the shortcomings, but non-player-characters (MacLeod calls them philosophical zombies) think everything is normal, so the real people can tell who's just a simulated person. The idea of zombies in philosophy (sometimes "p-zombies") is an exploration of the idea of consciousness. What if there were beings that acted just like people, but had no consciousness? Would it make a difference to them? Should we accord them lesser rights?

I consider the idea of p-zombies to be incoherent, but many smart people treat the question as exploring an important distinction. MacLeod here undercuts the point of the argument since there are actual behavioral differences. It isn't an exploration of whether consciousness matters, it's just that some characters in the story are imperfect simulations without an inner life, and the actual thinking beings can tell who they are. At the same time, MacLeod makes sure we notice that the robots and AIs who are active in the battles and the scheming do have an inner dialogue, and are making plans and collaborating with others to get things done.

The starting position for the agencies that represent the current Earth government and act under its protection is that only humans are allowed to be sentient. Even AIs' powers are circumscribed. Whenever self awareness arises otherwise, it must be stamped out. It's not clear why this would be a plausible stance, since it's clearly the case that the AIs can become self-aware for short periods, and autonomously operating robots have the capacity for spontaneous self awareness given the right trigger. So they must be constantly battling to defeat uprisings, and track down newly minted sophonts who either try to escape from control, or hide in occupied systems. It would make more sense to forbid use of tools with the capacity for self awareness, than to constantly try to stomp them out. I'd also have a hard time going along with a regime that wanted to outlaw and destroy a class of beings because they were self aware. Self aware and hostile is a separate thing, but that's not the distinction they've settled on.

Before one of the final battles, one of the leaders of the simulated humans challenges the combatants to each eat a slice of p-zombie flesh to prove that they believe they're in a simulation, and that there can't be any moral issues with simulated eating of simulated meat from simulated people that were never actually alive or aware. Except for a few who object to the initiation-ceremony aspect of the act, they all partake.

So there's a lot of exploration here of of philosophical questions of identity, and what it means to be human. The questions of liberty are mostly focussed on what kinds of agents deserve respect as actual people, though I think MacLeod fumbled some of the issues. The action is interesting and the conflict exciting. Besides there are also weaponized communications packets, interrogations of potentially hostile agents by sending them into a dungeon simulation, double and triple agents, and terraforming. It's a pretty good read, and the lead-in to part three, of course leaves a few things to be resolved.

Saturday, April 15, 2017

Dissidence, by Ken MacLeod

Ken MacLeod's The Corporation Wars: Dissidence, is the first book of trilogy. It (along with the second book in the series, Insurgence) is a finalist for the Prometheus award this year.

The story starts with a scene in which a pair of mining robots exploring an asteroid (in a distant solar system) and representing different corporate interests have an encounter, which leads them to realize they have opposing interests, which leads them each to recognize that they have interests, which leads them to self-awareness. The corporations are in a tenuous situation, trying to assert their ownership of the robots, trying to be civil about their contractual cooperation, but objecting strenuously to breaches by the opposing robots. The corporations end up fighting one another, and the robots band together and spread the concept of self-awareness to other nearby robots with sufficient computing capacity. Since the corporations don't seem likely to grant them independence, the robots form an independent faction in the upcoming battle. The corporations are loath to destroy their valuable property just yet.

When they do decide that military actions are called for, they end up dredging up opposing troops of uploaded warriors from past wars. All the AIs and non-self-aware robots, and other actors are under a deep compulsion that only humans and their uploads can actually be armed for combat, even against rogue self-aware robots. So the "humans" spent parts of their time embodied as people in a planetary environment, training and relaxing between missions. In the missions, they're downloaded into articulated space battle suits. Every time they die in battle, they return to the training site to start again. Over time, they find reason to doubt the reality of their home, and eventually detect serious cracks.

The uploads gradually learn enough about their realities to doubt that they're still fighting for the side they were loyal to in their first lives. Apparently part of the distinction between uploads and awakened AIs is that the operators can't tinker with opinions and loyalties directly, but they can easily lie and mislead about who they're representing, and what their opponents are fighting for. Of course, it wouldn't be an interesting story if the operator's control couldn't be subverted.

Ken MacLeod tells a good story, and gets us to think about what kinds of entities should have rights. The authorial point of view allows him to show the action in the eyes alternately of the awakened robots and the revived soldiers, so we feel their fundamental humanness. The characters, ex-human and non-human alike, think about who they should allow into their coalition, whether other actors are actually aware or just act like it, and have varying motives.

My biggest complaint about the story and the characters' attitudes is a simple acceptance among all the characters that some other characters are not real, based simply on statements from people in authority roles. In war, it doesn't make much sense to worry about whether the people shooting at you are actually thinking beings, but deciding that some category of bystanders don't have inner lives should be a cause for more intensive investigation. It's an easy allegation to make, and not far from standard attitudes about our enemies that we've mostly moved past.

Thursday, July 14, 2016

Jo Walton's The Just City investigates the nature of justice, while telling an enchanting story involving gods, mortals and robots trying to actually build the Just City hypothesized by Plato. The goddess Pallas Athene brings together 10,000 children and a few hundred adults from many different times and places to found a new city (on the island of Atlantis) according to Plato's prescriptions in The Republic. Plato's main goal in The Republic was to explain the nature of Justice (the words 'Just' and 'Justice' occur more than 150 times on the wikipedia page), so Walton has plenty of room to explore the idea from several different directions.

In order to get infrastructure in place without burdening the new inhabitants (who are supposed to be coddled and trained so they can understand Justice) the goddess brings in robots to build housing and meeting rooms. The robots are kept around to take care of maintenance and other tasks that Plato didn't describe the city's inhabitants as handling. When the historical Socrates (as envisioned by Walton) joins the city, he turns out to be a very inquisitive man. Since the robots display some autonomy, Socrates wonders whether they have individual personalities and whether they're thinking and aware. This leads to even more opportunities for questions about Justice.

Pallas Athene wants to populate the city with willing participants, so the children (exactly half girls and half boys) all are from disadvantaged circumstances. The adults are all people who prayed for a chance to live in Plato's Republic, so (considering how often the book is actually read in the original greek, and in what historical periods) most are men from antiquity, and the women are nearly all from more modern times. This leads to some interesting political factions, and changing of practices as time goes on and the oldest denizens die off first.

Not all of the children are happy to be there, even though all of them agree that their previous lives (most were slaves) were worse. Even so, not having been given a choice rankles with a few, and their reactions are also interesting.

Many of Plato's ideas are reasonably modern, but others are very outdated, like assigning citizens to societal roles according to their metal. The adults of The Just City spend a lot of effort training and testing the children in order to place them appropriately. Many of the adults are uncomfortable with this duty, but they carry it out, and even put their thumbs on the scales as necessary in order to make the numbers come out right according to Plato's very Greek ideas about numerical harmony. When some of the children figure out that test rankings are being adjusted in order to fit pre-defined notions of how many should be in each category, they challenge the adults, and as with everything else that goes on in the city, philosophical discussion and socratic dialogue ensues.

Since there's limited space on the island, procreation must be limited and sexual activity controlled. The children (and adults) find creative ways around the restrictions, but this means discussion of sexual mores and prohibitions are necessary. We hear about everything from rape and unwanted intimacy to Plato's ignorance of issues of women's hygiene. For the most part the adults attempt to do everything according to Plato's prescriptions, but there are several clear gaps in Plato's planning which leads to the need for endless committee meetings (most of which we, mercifully, hear about afterward, rather than having to endure.)

Walton does a wonderful job of presenting these philosophical questions of freedom, choice, and justice through the character's activity and interactions. In the end, we get to know these people who are all striving to be their best, and to create an environment in which justice is available to all, even though humans always have incompatible desires. We even get some satisfying answers to new and old questions and some unresolved issues to ponder on our own.

Monday, November 24, 2014

Confusion about AI

I like Brockman's Edge.org. I think of it as smart people talking to smart people, and I usually find the discussions very interesting. But I was unable to read the recent conversation on the Myth of AI, started by Jaron Lanier, and mostly focussed on Bostrom's Superintelligence. I expect Bostrom's work to be very important, but I haven't found time to read it yet. Superintelligence talks about the likely emergence of super-human intelligences, and what there is to look forward to, as well as what we should worry about. I consider these to be very important issues, though I don't think they're going to make a huge difference in the next 10-20 years. But further out it is indeed going to be crucial that we spend time planning out how to make these intelligences not act in a way that is inimical to our interests. It's not that there's any reason to expect them to be out to get us, it's just that they'll have goals, and if we don't make the right moves ahead of time, we'll be in the way of their achieving their goals.
Anyway, starting out with Lanier, the discussion seemed ill-informed. The opening quote has him saying "The idea that computers are people has a long and storied history." This conflates so many threads that it's hard to know where to start. It's like trying to have a discussion about free speech with someone whose opening point is a complaint about the Supreme Court having decided that "companies are people". As far as I can tell, the Court decided that corporations are one of the ways that people act in concert, and that they don't lose their free speech rights when they use that kind of organizational structure to speak publicly. The fact that this decision applies just as much to giant mega-corporations and to unions as to the two-person public outreach institute that was the actual subject of the case at issue is more due to the Court's belief in consistency.
The point of AI isn't that "computers are people", it's that thinking and acting can be reduced to computational processes (it all comes down to atoms and meat, after all) and so there's no reason to believe that we won't eventually be able to build machines out of silicon that do the same thing, and aren't subject to the same constraints as apply to biological mechanism made out of Carbon.
I was very happy to read Luke Muehlhauser's review (hat tip to Yvain). Luke agrees that the discussants at Edge are confused, and had the patience to analyze some of the misconceptions, and point back to the actual subjects of disagreement.

Wednesday, November 20, 2013

The Hydrogen Sonata: Iain M. Banks

Iain Banks's final Culture Novel The Hydrogen Sonata goes into greater depth than we've seen before on the process and consequences of a culture's subliming, in which they disappear from reality, and are presumed to gain access to some higher reality. It's a process that requires that an entire society make the decision collectively, and then nearly all of them must carry through roughly simultaneously, or it doesn't work somehow. The process is treated as some kind of graduation for civilizations, and its rhetorical role in the universe of the Culture is to make room for a constant influx of new civilizations arising anew. It's not absolutely required, and many societies have been around since the oldest known sublimations without making the choice.

The Hydrogen Sonata of the title is a composition designed to be played by someone with 4 arms on an eleven-stringed instrument. It's extremely difficult to play, and the focal character Vyr Cossont has been attempting to play it correctly all the way through as her life's project. The point, of course, is that she (and her civilization) is wealthy enough to be able to afford to work on completely frivolous projects like this.

The Gzilt, of which Cossont is a member, has voted to sublime, so Cossont has a limited time to finish her project. While she works on it, she gets embroiled in some shenanigans swirling around the circumstances of the sublimation. When a society decides to sublime, it's customary for others to clear the air if they had any unresolved grievances or issues. The Gzilt's progenitors, the Zihdren had a big secret, but they sublimed quite a while ago. Some Zihdren who missed the event would like to spill the beans, but other parties would prefer the secret remain hidden.

Cossont is reactivated by her old regiment who have heard what the Zihdren plan to say and want to know if it's true. The secret would undercut some of the Gzilt's most cherished beliefs about their civilization's rise. There's not a lot more I can say without giving away the plot. I enjoyed the adventure, and thought that Banks' adventure around the galaxy was quite entertaining. There are interesting chases, fights between highly armed AIs, bizarre characters, awe-inspiring architectural feats, and plenty more.

Monday, February 18, 2013

Surface Detail: Iain M. Banks

Iain M. Banks's Surface Detail is an exploration of hell on a couple of different levels. The main conflict in the story is between civilizations that believe in using hell as a real threat to keep sinners in line, and those that are opposed to the practice. According to the story, there are enough societies with a hell in their religion to have made it a common practice, once "people" started moving into simulations, that many created "hell" simulations and sentenced people to spend time there as a judicial punishment.

Most species and societies have a creation myth. The idea of a soul is also common, even if advanced civilizations mostly outgrow belief in it. Once you add in virtual reality, and then the ability to copy minds and host them in a simulation, the idea that virtual afterlives should resemble the cultural traditions' ideas of either heaven of hell seems obvious. The problem is that as people (sophonts of whatever stripe) grow more sophisticated (see Pinker's book on violence) many stop believing that perpetual hell could be a reasonable punishment.

The Culture took a fairly active stance (unusual for them) against the hells, and after some galactic period of time, there was a relative stalemate, in which two factions had very strong opinions that the other side was wrong. "Eventually, though, a war was agreed on as the best way to settle the whole dispute". A virtual war, of course, with both sides agreeing that the outcome on the virtual battlefield would determine the victor in the real world. There's a sub-plot for the virtual battles and another for the political and logistical maneuvering that leaks into the real world.

There's another sub-plot that takes place in one of the simulated hells. Banks does a really good job of envisioning what it would take to make a truly scary hell. In a civilizations that does have hell simulations, but which tries to keep their existence from being generally known [I think hells are like Dr. Strangelove's Doomsday device: "the whole point of a Doomsday Machine is lost, if you *keep* it a *secret*!"] there are some muckraking journalists who want to convince everyone that the stories are true, so they volunteer to infiltrate. Things don't turn out well for them, and this gives Banks the opportunity to really turn the screws and come up with more and more unbearable tortures.

The major plot involves an evil industrialist who kept a defeated rival's daughter as a slave, and eventually killed her. She gets a chance to come back and try to take revenge. The "coming back" requires a trip across the galaxy with a culture Abominator class ship the "Falling Outside The Normal Moral Constraints". FOTNMC is a real personality, and seems pretty unstoppable in a battle of wits or an actual battle.

I really like Banks' Culture stories, and even though this one is filled with plausible and explicit hells and some truly evil and some powerful and amoral characters, I thought it was both fun and had philosophical depth. The proprietor of hell has to deal with someone who can't be satisfactorily tortured because she has really given up all hope, so he comes up with a way to give her just enough hope to allow her to suffer again. Truly nasty.

Monday, December 26, 2011

Daemon and Freedom, Daniel Suarez

Daniel Suarez's Daemon and Freedom tell a single story about an artificial intelligence, (the "Daemon" of the title) created by a game designer, that becomes extremely powerful in the real economy through violence and by hacking software systems throughout the world. In the end its creator offers to relinquish that power, but by then agents of various governments have shown how ruthless they can be in trying to defeat it, and a representative of the people being protected says it should continue running things. The story is occasionally violent, and includes several explicit misogynistic and sadistic scenes that I had trouble reading. The rest of the story is interesting enough on a couple of levels that I kept going.

It's a fast-paced story involving MMORPGs, augmented reality systems, and an AI created by a wealthy software gaming entrepreneur. The story (and its characters) presumes that the world's economy is controlled by a few powerful, wealthy, and unscrupulous tycoons who pull the strings of the big governments and are getting out of control. The AI makes a preemptive attack and attempts to take over in order to prevent an eventuality which is never really made clear. Instead, we see the US and other governments' secret agencies and militaries attempt to strike back at a system they don't understand, and which is decentralized and has infiltrated most of the world's computer systems. This allows it to watch its opponents and strike back in completely unexpected ways. It also invests heavily in a fleet of autonomous weaponized vehicles that it deploys very effectively.

The depiction of disaffected people from many backgrounds being recruited into a hidden network that deploys them on unexplained tasks that they willingly take on is disquieting. It's clear that many people who join have made thinly justified assumptions that the network's objectives are consistent with their values, but others do it because they're desperate for a job or a sense of belonging, and are willing to ignore their moral qualms about what they're doing--building, testing, delivering obviously dangerous weapons, or worse. It's plausible that many people would go along with an AI that could get this far, and the thing that keeps this from being possible now is that neither AI nor conventional intelligence augmented with modern tools give anyone enough power to pull it off. Who knows how soon that will change, though.

I thought the violence was over the top, and not really necessary to the story. I disagree with the world view that predominates here and says that malevolent actors control signifiant aspects of our economy and will go to extreme lengths to maintain their influence. I found the depictions of technology (other than the killing machines) reasonably plausible, and won't be surprised to see augmented reality, consensual shared overlays, and large-scale real-time cooperation. I expect the cooperation to be much less centrally controlled, and much more either spontaneous, or polycentric. And my strong expectations about AI are that it will arise gradually and in many places. It is very unlikely that one person (much less likely even than one independent group) will make a breakthrough that will enable them to take over. This particular question has been much debated, and there isn't clear agreement on how it will play out, but I firmly agree with Robin Hanson's position that a "hard takeoff" under the control of a single entity isn't a likely scenario. That one person could pull it off with help from at most two colleagues (as in the story) is completely unbelievable.

Thursday, July 07, 2011

The Ego Tunnel, Thomas Metzinger

Thomas Metzinger's The Ego Tunnel is a provocative look at the nature of consciousness. Metzinger takes an innovative approach to the questions and raises some interesting issues without seeming to have a strong grasp of the subject.

Metzinger's project is to explore the nature of consciousness by examining two neglected states of awareness: out-of-body experiences (OOBEs), and lucid dreaming. He argues that studying these phenomena will illuminate the problem of consciousness and make everything clear. I'll agree that the exploration was intriguing, but I don't think we learned anything important over what Dennett made clear in Consciousness Explained. At the end, Metzinger heads out to left field for some completely ungrounded speculations about AI and ethics. In these areas, he's clearly way out of his depth. He doesn't understand what's been done in AI, or what's possible, and his claims about the "obvious" rights of artificial creatures and how it wouldn't be moral to treat them is unconvincing.

When introducing the idea of studying unusual states of consciousness, Metzinger makes the reasonable point that there is enough consistency in the experiences reported during OOBEs and lucid dreaming that it makes sense to take a look at them and see whether the commonalities are instructive. I thought he did a good job of drawing some clear lines around what it feels like to be conscious in comparison to other states in which there is awareness without self-awareness. The title comes from his metaphor of an "Ego Tunnel" as a constrained mental space encompassing the limited set of things that one is aware of at a moment in time. Metzinger points to recent fMRI work and claims that neurophysiologists are finding a neural correlate of consciousness, which they can identify in the brain, and so they can conclusively say that lucid dreaming and OOBEs are conscious states. It's not clear to me that whatever the MRIs are finding really corresponds to the same thing we mean by consciousness, but the argument that these are conscious states is convincing enough without that evidence. He brings up the idea of mirror neurons, and points toward an interesting argument that this feature of our brain is responsible for our being able to model ourselves as an active agent like others we can observe. This argument only occupied a couple of pages, and ended (I thought) inconclusively.

Unfortunately, Metzinger's identification of these mental states as reasonably corresponding to consciousness doesn't enable him to say any more about what consciousness is, what survival-related purpose it serves, or anything coherent about consequences. He tries to talk about AI and ethics, but his justification doesn't get beyond the level of our responsibility for our creations, and the primacy of experience. For him, it's obvious that it would be immoral to turn off anything that has experiences, so in his view, we shouldn't even explore the creation of artificial creatures, since we can't establish a theoretical lower bound for what it would mean to have experiences. This is a much deeper subject than he seems aware of, and he barely brushed the surface of it. With his (apparently) shallow understanding of the issues, his speculations are hard to take very seriously.

I thought the first two thirds of the book were worth reading for their exploration and presentation of how OOBEs and lucid dreaming relate to consciousness. The fMRI and other studies of these states may add significantly to our understanding of how the brain works and eventually to a clearer explanation of what's happening in the neurons during thought and consciousness.

Wednesday, March 30, 2011

Zendegi, Greg Egan

Greg Egan's Zendegi is another novel nominated for this year's Prometheus Award that features social media being used by an underground movement to topple a government. But this is Greg Egan, so there must be something about silicon consciousness or artificial life involved, right? Well, yes there is, but the political plot works out to be more interesting this time around. Egan's focal characters are Martin Seymour, an ex-pat American journalist living in Iran and Nasim Golestani, an Iranian scientist who worked in the US but has now returned. At the beginning of the story Golestani is working on the Human Connectome project, which gives her a background in mapping the brain to software. Seymour gets involved when cell-phone pictures help topple the Iranian religious dictatorship.

In the second half of the novel, Golestani works on improving the AI for a virtual reality game company that is struggling to keep up with its competition, while Seymour runs a bookstore in Tehran. Golestani starts incorporating data and software from the Connectome project into the NPCs, which raises the ire of fundamentalists. Seymour, meanwhile, has contracted a fatal disease, and wants to find a way to ensure that someone he trusts will continue to provide guidance to his son, and hits on the idea of getting Golestani to build an artificial mind for him.

Egan's depiction in Diaspora of the development of consciousness in artificial minds was ground-breaking, but nothing of similar scope happens here. There are many scenes in virtual reality, but the story-telling emphasis is on Seymour's attention to influencing his son's maturation. The descriptions of the development of the artificial consciousnesses focused on brain mapping rather than awareness. In the end, the characters decide that the simulacrum of Seymour isn't up to the task of mentoring his son, which renders many of the interesting conflicts and questions moot. The protesters against enslaving artificial being can be pacified with a promise to keep them below the level of a simple automaton, and Golestani doesn't have to grapple with her own moral sensibilities about just how conscious they might become. It feels like Egan really side-stepped the issue here. And his solution doesn't do anything to prevent other developers from taking the same step later.

It's especially bad because Egan has previously made it clear that understands these issues. His Diasporah, and Permutation City directly address issues related to artificial consciousness. In the latter work, his characters explore a large variety of different scenarios of partial experience, and directly discuss the issues concerning how real they are as persons, and what rights a partially aware entity should have.

While the story is well-written, topical, and engaging, the liberty-related themes are sparse and limited. The populace revolts against a corrupt dictatorship, but that's more celebration than presentation of issues. Artificial creatures are developed, but never get advanced enough for their rights to be a serious question. It's neither a strong contender for this year's Prometheus, nor as much as I would have expected from Egan.

Thursday, February 04, 2010

J. Storrs Hall: Beyond AI

J. Storrs Hall (JoSH)'s Beyond AI provides a good and thorough introduction to the issues surrounding AI. I had expected JoSH to try to explain how to build an AI, and to fail at that, because no one really knows what the necessary breakthroughs will be. I expected that because I've known him long enough to know that he's a smart, ambitious guy who's thoroughly familiar with AI, who doesn't seem to have been drawn into the debates and discussion about "friendly AI". But he surprised me by writing a very readable, very useful book that doesn't say much that is new, but organizes it in a way that lays out the important issues in context and gives a road map for how we can learn to deal with the changes that development of smarter than human AI will bring to our world.

After a brief dip into dreams from antiquity of creating artificial creatures and how they were expected to change the world, JoSH starts the technical history with feedback theory and cybernetics, and shows how those evolved into control theory, information theory, and neural networks. He then shows where his roots are with a section titled "The Golden Age" that talks about work on symbolic AI through the 60s and 70s. This led to what looked like rapid progress and solutions to a number of problems: competence in various microworlds, rudimentary ability to generate understandable language, ability to understand constrained language, and promising representations for abstract knowledge. This is followed by a chapter that shows how the pioneers became disillusioned with their approaches by the end of the 1970s, as they harnessed their tools to solve a wider variety of problems, but discovered that they weren't solving harder problems, or finding any approaches that were leading to general mastery.

Any particular problem area could apparently be analyzed and reduced to a mechanical solution, but that solution didn't seem to help with the next one. JoSH attributes the stumble to the fact that the early approaches relied on programmers explicitly coding specific knowledge about each domain into an architecture organized around a formal model of the domain. This works for a constrained area, but leaves no room for fuzzy boundary cases. People are good at interpreting definitions and instructions loosely and knowing when to do so, but a program that can diagram sentences and summarize a typical daily newspaper would be useless if you wanted to translate the user's manual for a consumer appliance, or generate route instructions for a navigation application.

The next part of the book addresses the nature of mind: what general intelligence is, and what it would take to build something that could understand itself well enough to enhance its own functioning. JoSH draws together evolution (in E. O. Wilson's Sociobiology), with advances in computing and philosophy. Researchers in the 90s were explaining how the mind is made of separate modules that we can analyze in isolation, and whose distinct failures can be seen in identifiable mental disorders. When artificial minds are contemplated from that point of view, the problem of building one to suit appears more tractable, and the idea of recursive self improvement becomes more manageable. In our own brains, it's clear that there are distinct modules with separate responsibilities, that when one part becomes damaged, other brain regions can provide substitutes for the functionality at a reduced efficiency, and that the modules communicate with one another in some flexible way rather than relying on formal, precise interfaces. That makes it easier to believe that an artificial mind, built modularly, could use its understanding to upgrade and improve itself.

One way to resolve the issue that symbolic AI faced, that their representations were only useful in the verbal domain, and not in the physical has been addressed by the modern embodied approach. There has been a lot more focus recently on building robots that interact with the world to build up their model of their environment. This is a start on figuring out how learning works, and one of the discoveries is that agents interacting with the physical world can often get by with much less internal representation that earlier generations expected. The physical world provides a local representation of itself which, if you can interpret it, can answer many of the questions that arise when you need them. This simplifies the learning and doesn't require as much one-on-one training as building a formal model. It also seems to have been particularly robust, where the formal approaches were brittle. These embodied agents have also provided a more situated environment for re-exploring earlier lessons on reasoning and Bayesian inference. If the robot has to be able to adapt to a variety of different locations, then you're better off giving it the ability to become familiar with wherever it ends up than if it can't do anything until someone explains where the doors are and which outlets its supposed to use.

JoSH spends a chapter outlining an approach based on reasoning by analogy with its own history. It reminds me of Jeff Hawkins' description of how the brain works in his book On Intelligence, but he doesn't go into much detail. It's one part of what will be needed, but the situated AI work will provide many more pertinent clues.

The last third of Beyond AI focuses on social consequences. First: what, who, where and, when, then the questions of free will, what morality should apply and whether it will be friendly to us, and finally whether there will be a singularity, and if so, which one. JoSH identifies four approaches that might lead to different WHAT answers: direct synthesis of AI software, emulation of the human brain at the neural or at some higher level, or building a learning machine that grows up to be a full AI. As far as WHO will win the race, JoSH identifies the military, university and industrial labs, and start-ups and the open source community as contenders, without giving any of them an edge. When he addresses WHERE the breakthrough is likely to take place, he tips his hand as to the shape he expects it to take.

Given the international nature of both the scientific community and the Internet, however, [...] The answer is most likely, everywhere.

As to WHEN, his slow projection is for everything except human-level flexibility and creativity by 2025, and 2035 for general human equivalence. With a few key breakthroughs, he thinks that general human equivalence could arrive in the 2020s.

JoSH does an unusually good job of explaining why free will isn't a problem. First of all, I want to point out that he laid the groundwork earlier by talking about how we understand gravity in order to be able to forestall a crucial objection in the middle without requiring a long aside. The whole book seems to have been constructed this way, with explanations early on that help reduce confusions later without seeming out of place when they occur. As he presents it, the problem is that we have a strong intuition that there's some contradiction between the deterministic nature of the universe and our ability to make choices that change the way things will turn out. JoSH points out that in order to make predictions about how our behavior will affect things, we have to have a mental model that includes a deterministic world which we inhabit, but that our model of ourselves has to be one that shows us making choices. We have to think of ourselves as considering alternatives and evaluating them and then making a choice. (When we're sophisticated, the models show that other people are also making choices) Given that the mental model allows us to make decisions, it has to have those two parts. Even if everything is deterministic, the self-model has to consider different possibilities before choosing actions. That part can't feel deterministic if it is to succeed as a model. That's all free will is.

The conclusions reached in Beyond AI about the ultimate shape of the future are remarkable similar to my own. Change will be large, but will arrive gradually, and there won't be any dominating breakthroughs. Many people will develop many different systems that advance the state of the art along a broad front. The groups best able to take advantage of other people's work will be working in the open and sharing their results. In this kind of environment, the best way to exploit your advancement is to bring it into the market place. AIs that emerge in this kind of context will see that cooperation with others and competition to best serve customers and provide value is the best way to get ahead. This kind of morality will serve them, and will lead them to be friendly in the important sense. Just as Adam Smith explained in his Invisible Hand metaphor, they'll help us (their customers) because that's the best way to advance their own interests.

Friday, September 12, 2008

Nick Humphrey: Seeing Red

Nick Humphrey's Seeing Red is another attempt to explain consciousness, but from a slightly different angle. Humphrey clearly understands what it would mean to produce an explanation, and makes some progress on the task. Humphrey starts not with what it means to think about something or to be aware of something, but with the more fundamental fact of perception of something outside of ourselves. The focal perception is of a red sensation. There's something in your environment that produces the perception of redness. What just happened to you? What does it mean that it makes you sense the presence of red? Why can you share this experience with others who also perceive the redness or with people who aren't present but still understand what you mean?

Humphrey first concentrates his attention on the internal details: first you perceive, then you become aware that you are perceiving. You may put words to the sensation or you might not, but Humphrey takes pains to point out that the perceiving and awareness are two separate facts. If you then talk to someone else about the perception (which you can do because you're aware of it), then of necessity each of you has some kind of "theory of mind"; a mental model that represents the fact that whatever it means to perceive, you are something that can do it, and other people are capable of the same thing.

Having set these aspects of reality out, Humphrey goes to some trouble to demonstrate that they are separate facets of reality, and all need to be present in an actual explanation. He talks about things like 'blindsight' and optical illusions in order to convince people who aren't keeping up that all these things are distinct facets of reality and need to be distinct in any explanation.

In the second half of this small book, Humphrey explains that consciousness arises out of the neurons in the brain, and that their role is to reflect and represent what's really going on in the world. He wants to present an evolutionary explanation of why they arose, but he only really justifies the fact that they are useful. The mechanism and history that allowed a feedback process between sensing and acting to arise and be passed down as a competitive advantage eludes him. And he doesn't have much to say about how the neural substrate might represent facts about reality in such a way that it could actually be useful to an aware, active agent interacting with the world.

My bottom line is that this book lays out the issues fairly clearly in a way that ought to be interesting and convincing to someone who is just starting to think about how consciousness might work, but the explanations fall short of answering the deeper questions. On the other hand, Humphrey's stated goal in the book is to show that consciousness matters and that it can be productive to think carefully about it. That much he succeeded at.

Friday, November 23, 2007

Progress on Augmenting Intelligence

I just read a new paper by Jeff Shrager (currently at CommerceNet, which funded my work on Zocalo in 2005 and 2006; thanks to Tom Malone of MIT's Sloan School for the pointer to the paper) on a system designed to support group reasoning processes based on Bayesian principles. Having just read Eliezer Yudkowsky's post on Artificial Addition, I was sensitive to the notion that some older attempts at AI had failed to enforce any semantic relationship between the nodes that are intended to represent particular concepts.

The system described by Shrager et. al. uses a language understanding system (presumably based on the same tools as PowerSet relies on; I've been admitted to PowerSet's trials, but can't access the activation code, so I haven't tried their demo yet). This means that for the first time to my awareness, the system can help by finding semantic connections between assertions. This isn't trying to be AI, but computer support for collaborative reasoning is just as much on the path to enhancing our power to change the world as is AI.

Saturday, October 01, 2005

Eric Baum: What is Thought?

There was some substance to Eric Baum's What is Thought?, but it didn't add much to my understanding of the title question. Baum's has been working in AI, writing software systems, some of them reasonably successful. He argues that intelligence can be recognized in any system that acts effectively based on a compact representation of the world. The evolution of more successful creatures was a continuing process of discovery of better representations of the nature of the world. He takes it as a given that the mind is a program. (Which is part of why he didn't add much to my understanding of what thought consists of.)

His main argument seems to be that thought and the mind are the result of evolution producing better and better representations. This is neither surprising nor new. He makes little attempt to explain how the mind works beyond the fact that it uses analogies. Apparently he thinks this is fundamental and important. His focus is on economy of representation, and he apparently believes that reusing representations is the source of power. I'm not sure why this doesn't seem more powerful to me, since I often say that the source of the power of OOP is in the re-use that polymorphism gives you. I think the difference is that he didn't show any mechanisms by which the mind could be re-using modules. He shows how modular tools can be re-used in other architectures, but he doesn't say what the architecture of the mind is.

The valuable contribution of the book is in its description of the Hayek system that Baum developed with colleagues at NEC Research. This was a general learning system based on evolution and agoric feedback. The design of this system made possible the evolution of separate agents that could work together to reach a goal. I haven't heard of other systems that were successful with this combination of goals, though there have been other attempts. The aspects of the approach that seem crucial to the success were that one agent at a time was allowed to make changes, and the agent was chosen at any point by an auction among the agents. The agent who wins an auction pays the winning bid to the previous agent, and afterward gets paid the price bid by the next winner. The agents are charged rent when they're not running, and for cpu when they are running. Randomly mutated copies of the more successful agents are added to the population over time.

It's not obvious how you get this economy started, but once it's going, each agent competes to raise the value of the current state of the world so its successors will bid more than the previous state was worth. As long as there's an agent who can produce a final state of the world that is valuable according to some external metric, everyone can earn a living wage along the way. The problems he applied this ecology to included a simple blocks world problem, Rubik's Cube, and the traveling salesman problem.

According to someone familiar with the literature, the only other systems that tried to use markets in a similar way made the mistake of choosing as the next active agent by a lottery proportional to agents' bids rather than simply choosing the highest bidder. This reduces the link between agents that can cooperatively solve the problem, enabling less effective agents to intervene and destroy any order that has been built up. The clean approach in Hayek seems much more likely to work for long chains of agents, and to give evolution a better opportunity to discover shortcuts and more efficient approaches.

If you have a system that works, but not well, modified agents can attempt to shortcut the working path. If they reliably do better, the bypassed agents can wither away. If the new agent is unreliable, both paths can stick around long enough to compete, and possibly combine with an intermediate version that has a better model of when the different plans are applicable.

His discussion of the evolution of language in chapter 13 was particularly unsatisfying. He pointed out that language can't start growing beyond the level of innate language (which seems to exist in many creatures, from honeybees to vervets) until you get both the ability to learn to produce new words and the ability to learn new words. He ends up not explaining how evolution surpassed this hurdle; instead treating it as the reason why it was so rare for evolution to produce the ability.

Filed in: