Showing posts with label EvolutionaryPsychology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label EvolutionaryPsychology. Show all posts

Sunday, February 09, 2014

The Righteous Mind, by Jonathan Haidt

Jonathan Haidt's The Righteous Mind argues that our political leanings are strongly tied to our moral intuitions, and explains that people in each of the main political categories have different fundamental tenets that they each believe in strongly. There's some overlap between the various groups, but Haidt presents evidence that there's a lot of consistency within each group. If you hope to convince people on the opposite side of these divides of anything important, it's crucial to understand the foundations their reasoning is based on. If you believe the people you argue with are confused or evil, rather than reasoning from different premises, your arguments will fail to sway them.

In part one, Righteous Mind argues that intuition comes first, and strategic reasoning second. People enter a discussion of morality with instincts that tell them the answers. Most of the arguments they make are driven by their instincts, and little follows from intellectual considerations. Haidt relies heavily on the metaphor of a rider on an elephant. It's possible for the rider to decide which direction they go, but the elephant makes the first choice, and the driver has to convince the elephant if they're to end up somewhere else.

The second part covers the common foundations of our moral instincts. Most philosophers have concluded that morality is based on fairness or avoidance of harm. Haidt's research has shown that across cultures, there are actually six relatively consistent value frameworks that different political camps choose among. He says "The righteous mind is like a tongue with six taste receptors."

The third part shows that common feelings about morality bind communities together and blinds members of those communities to the goals, tastes, and priorities of their neighbors. He argues that religion evolved because of its contribution to social cohesion in contrast to the common atheist accusation that it's mostly religion is a memetic parasite that wins at the cost of its carriers.

Haidt is a master at presenting short vignettes that adherents to one viewpoint will say shows immoral behavior and others will be fine with. Whatever your outlook, he knows some stories that your group will be the only one to approve of, and other stories that you'll find to be disturbing while people with other political views won't be bothered. This technique seems to have been the core of the research underlying the book. He uses it to good effect in teasing apart the most basic drivers of people's instincts about right and wrong.

The underlying drives presented in the book. The names represent virtues and the adaptive challenge in the evolutionary environment that they protected us from. Haidt often refers to them just by the name of the virtue, and so will I.

  • care/harm
  • fairness/cheating
  • liberty/oppression
  • loyalty/betrayal
  • authority/subversion
  • sanctity/degradation
Liberals rely on caring, then fairness and liberty. Conservatives rely on all six, somewhat equally. Libertarians rely most on liberty, and a little on fairness. On the left, fairness often implies equality, but on the right it means proportionality—people should be rewarded in proportion to what they contribute, even if that guarantees unequal outcomes. Liberals also have a streak of sanctity, but it usually applies to nature and cleanliness rather than religious faith. Notice that there is no foundation used by the left that is not also important to the right. Liberals reject altogether some of the values that matter to Conservatives. To Liberals, loyalty and respect for authority can be outright negatives.

If you have trouble seeing how virtues other than the ones you believe in can be seen as fundamental, you're going to miss most of the point of the book.

When Haidt's research team asked liberals and conservatives to predict one another's responses to his Moral Foundations survey, they found that conservatives were the best able to understand other's motivations. Liberals seem to assume that where others hold values more weakly than liberals do (because there are other values they hold more strongly) that those with whom they disagree hold the opposite position from them rather than understanding that value but having another, higher priority. Many Liberals, when asked to describe Conservative values, say that they are actively pursuing evil ends. Conservatives, since they use all 6 metrics, can recognize when others are relying on particular values. Libertarians are most handicapped by this standard (having only one prime value), but their advantage is that, being in the minority, they are more used to talking to people with different points of view.

Part three of the book argues first, that humans are uniquely social creatures (He cites Tomasello, an expert on chimpanzee cognition, who said "It is inconceivable that you would ever see two chimpanzees carrying a log together.") Bees and ants sacrifice themselves for the hive, but individual cooperation is extremely rare if you exclude sex and other instinctive behavior. Second, that religion is mostly used to bind us into communities. He argues that we have a built-in "hive switch" that makes us bind more tightly and unthinkingly into groups. The release of oxytocin binds people to their groups, not to humanity as a whole. Finally, he argues that the New Atheists (Dennett, Dawkins, and Harris, primarily) miss the main point of religion, which is to bind people into groups. The fact that they naturally divide everyone into insider and enemy is a consequence of human psychology. The rituals "that the New Atheists dismiss as costly, inefficient, and irrational turn out to be a solution to one of the hardest problems human [societies] face: cooperation without kinship." Haidt uses these points to support his conclusion that treating people who disagree with us (or merely act differently) as repugnant is a deep-seated reaction.

Haidt says he grew up a liberal, and it was partly due to his studies of different political approaches that led him to a conservative viewpoint. It was also as a result of his studies that he came to see that libertarians have a distinct approach that is straightforward to describe in his framework. The descriptions of the liberal progress narrative (a quote from Christian Smith's Moral, Believing Animals) and the conservative mindset (a description of the "Reagan narrative" from Westen's The Political Brain) are masterful in their contrasts. Smith wrote

Once upon a time, the vast majority of human persons suffered in societies and social institutions that were unjust, unhealthy, repressive, and oppressive. These traditional societies were reprehensible because of their deep-rooted inequality, exploitation, and irrational traditionalism…But the noble human aspiration for autonomy, equality, and prosperity struggled mightily against the forces of misery and oppression, and eventually succeeded in establishing modern, liberal, democratic, capitalist, welfare societies. While modern social conditions hold the potential to maximize the individual freedom and pleasure of all, there is much work to be done to dismantle the powerful vestiges of inequality, exploitations, and repression.
Westen's description is
Once upon a time, America was a shining beacon. Then liberals came along and erected an enormous federal bureaucracy that handcuffed the invisible hand of the free market. They subverted our traditional American values and opposed God and Faith at every step of the way. … Instead of requiring that people work for a living, they siphoned money from hardworking Americans and gave it to Cadillac-driving drug addicts and welfare queens. Instead of punishing criminals, they tried to "understand" them. Instead of worrying about the victims of crime, they worried about the rights of criminals, … Instead of adhering to traditional American values of family, fidelity, and personal responsibility, they preached promiscuity, premarital sex, and the gay lifestyle … and they encouraged a feminist agenda that undermined traditional family roles. … Instead of projecting strength to those who would do evil around the world, they cut military budgets, disrespected our soldiers in uniform, burned our flag, and chose negotiation and multilateralism.
Haidt points out that these are very much descriptions of the American liberal and conservative viewpoints. In other countries, the narrative would be different, and in some, the constellation of values wouldn't align the same way. But in all the countries he's studied, the same 6 underlying values keep coming up in different combinations, and his story problems elicit the same distinctions, when adjusted for local customs and unique traditions.

Haidt believes that the crucial value that liberals misunderstand is moral capital (he's careful to draw a distinction from social capital). He cites Bertrand Russell to make the point: "Every community is exposed to two opposite dangers: ossification through too much discipline and reverence of tradition, on the one hand; on the other hand, dissolution, or subjection to foreign conquest, through the growth of an individualism and personal independence that makes cooperation impossible." Haidt then says

If you are trying to change an organization or a society and you do not consider the effects of your changes on moral capital, you're asking for trouble. This, I believe, is the fundamental blind spot of the left. It explains why liberal reforms so often backfire, and why communist revolutions usually end up in despotism. It is the reason I believe that liberalism—which has done so much to bring about freedom and equal opportunity—is not sufficient as a governing philosophy. It tends to overreach, change too many things too quickly, and reduce the stock of moral capital inadvertently. Conversely, while conservatives do a better job of preserving moral capital, they often fail to notice certain classes of victims, fail to limit the predations of certain powerful interests, and fail to see the need to change or update institutions as times change.

I found this to be a very helpful book, explaining how different factions see the world, and it's presented in a way that's sympathetic to everyone's views. If you want to argue constructively with people it helps tremendously to be able to understand where they're coming from. Having more of an understanding of other points of view also makes it much easier to hear what someone else's concerns are so you can address those directly. When we misunderstand one another we often talk past one another, not realizing that the other party has different values, rather than misunderstanding our position. Too much of politics today is based on ascribing bad motives to the opposition.

Friday, September 12, 2008

Nick Humphrey: Seeing Red

Nick Humphrey's Seeing Red is another attempt to explain consciousness, but from a slightly different angle. Humphrey clearly understands what it would mean to produce an explanation, and makes some progress on the task. Humphrey starts not with what it means to think about something or to be aware of something, but with the more fundamental fact of perception of something outside of ourselves. The focal perception is of a red sensation. There's something in your environment that produces the perception of redness. What just happened to you? What does it mean that it makes you sense the presence of red? Why can you share this experience with others who also perceive the redness or with people who aren't present but still understand what you mean?

Humphrey first concentrates his attention on the internal details: first you perceive, then you become aware that you are perceiving. You may put words to the sensation or you might not, but Humphrey takes pains to point out that the perceiving and awareness are two separate facts. If you then talk to someone else about the perception (which you can do because you're aware of it), then of necessity each of you has some kind of "theory of mind"; a mental model that represents the fact that whatever it means to perceive, you are something that can do it, and other people are capable of the same thing.

Having set these aspects of reality out, Humphrey goes to some trouble to demonstrate that they are separate facets of reality, and all need to be present in an actual explanation. He talks about things like 'blindsight' and optical illusions in order to convince people who aren't keeping up that all these things are distinct facets of reality and need to be distinct in any explanation.

In the second half of this small book, Humphrey explains that consciousness arises out of the neurons in the brain, and that their role is to reflect and represent what's really going on in the world. He wants to present an evolutionary explanation of why they arose, but he only really justifies the fact that they are useful. The mechanism and history that allowed a feedback process between sensing and acting to arise and be passed down as a competitive advantage eludes him. And he doesn't have much to say about how the neural substrate might represent facts about reality in such a way that it could actually be useful to an aware, active agent interacting with the world.

My bottom line is that this book lays out the issues fairly clearly in a way that ought to be interesting and convincing to someone who is just starting to think about how consciousness might work, but the explanations fall short of answering the deeper questions. On the other hand, Humphrey's stated goal in the book is to show that consciousness matters and that it can be productive to think carefully about it. That much he succeeded at.

Saturday, July 19, 2008

Arthur De Vany: Hollywood Economics

Arthur De Vany's Hollywood Economics gives a detailed look at an extreme example of a long-tail industry, the movies. The first half of the book consists of some technical papers that De Vany wrote during his career as an economist. Some of them are quite technical, but they lay the foundation for De Vany's contention that making movies is a highly unpredictable business.

These opening articles demonstrate that there is little predictability in the movie business, and investors, directors, producers, and actors who try to improve their odds by spending more money on special effects, hiring people from the A list, advertising heavily, or whatever else haven't studied the numbers well enough.

The old slogan "nobody knows anything" arises because of the nature of movie releases. Audiences vary from week to week, and they have an always changing menu of movies to choose from. Their reaction may depend on what's in the news, what hits have appeared recently, and whether the blockbuster that came out six weeks ago still has legs. And that's before we try to take account of the intrinsic merit of the story, the acting, how broad the distribution is, etc. Every week is a new tournament with some old and some new players. The audience can't make a judgment about any particular movie until they see it, and they don't make their evaluations from a clean slate.

The statistics deriving from this chaotic process produces the now familiar power law distribution. 70% of movies made are unprofitable, but the business makes money on the whole. most of the 30% that make money barely do better than breaking even; only a few a really successful, and the business of Hollywood is all about trying to make enough movies and give yourself enough chances that you can capture one of the few runaway successes. De Vany talks about how how studios, actors and directors should structure contracts so that the right people have the right incentives, and the right people make money when there is a hit. He then analyzes some actual contracts to show that they follow his rules: star players give up some straight pay for a share of the distant upper tail. The contracts talk about events that are meaningful for less than one movie in a hundred, but that's where all the money is, and one hit in that category can make you rich.

After he's laid the groundwork in the first half of the book, De Vany talks about the breakup of the Hollywood studio system at the end of the 1940's. I had no idea the anti-trust crusaders had even done this. The golden age of the Hollywood studio system was ended by a series of anti-trust cases (culminating in the Supreme Court) that denied the studios the ability to own movie theaters, and restricted the kinds of contracts they could write with independent theater owners. The result was that the studios lost certainty about being able to place the films they made, so they had to be much more careful in deciding what movies to fund, and couldn't plan a season's production coherently. De Vany shows how poorly the courts understood the movie business, and that they didn't achieve any of their objectives in terms of making the business fairer for independent distributors, theaters, or production companies.

I found the book to be fascinating, though quite dense. If the technical analysis in the first half of the book seems daunting, I recommend skimming it; just pay attention to his conclusions, since you'll need them to appreciate the findings in the second half of the book. I suspect there are many lessons that are applicable to other people trying to make money in other long-tail businesses. (Most of the discussion about long-tail is about making money by exploiting the long thin tail, but someone's making money from the tall, rich head of that curve.) The dynamics of other businesses are different, so you'll have to figure out what the drivers are for your uncertainty. De Vany does a great job of explaining the vagaries of the movie business, but not every business is an iterated tournament in which some of the contenders are new each week, while others have advantages or disadvantages due to their recent performance. There's a limit to the number of movies that can be playing in first run theaters every week, so some have to be dropped in order to make room for the constant flow of new releases.

I found this book after reading De Vany's blog for a while in 2005 and 2006. His articles on the movie business were quite interesting, but there's also a bunch of interesting material on evolutionary fitness, health, and sports.

Wednesday, December 05, 2007

Keith Stanovich: The Robot's Rebellion

Keith Stanovich, in his book The Robot's Rebellion , takes the stance that we are vehicles driven by our genes and memes, and tries to give us the tools and a place to stand to figure out what matters to us. (The metaphor is that we are robots driven by these influences, and we should want to regain control for ourselves.) Since the only tools we can use to reason with and all of our values are held by and in the control of our genes and memes, this is a daunting task.

Without explicitly recognizing that he's discussing epistemology, Stanovich does a commendable job of presenting a summary of the current research on standard biases in human reasoning. Once you understand the predilections of the tools you rely on, you can try to compensate for them, and start to figure out what you want. Stanovich's proposal is fundamentally consonant with Pancritical Rationalism. (Which is the source of the name of this blog.) The metaphor he uses is that of repairing a ship plank-by-plank while at sea. Regardless of how much or how little confidence you have in the current framework, you have to stand somewhere in order to start the process of examining what's there and replacing parts you don't have confidence in.

Much of the book repeats stories and results that have been widely reported in such popular books as Stumbling on Happiness, Adapting Minds, The Mating Mind, and The Blank Slate, but this material is easy to skim. Stanovich spends a lot of ink explaining that some of our analysis is done by mechanisms that are built-in and harder to introspect on or to change. This is relevant later when he talks about reconciling different desires.

One example of meta-rationality that Stanovich presents well is the point that introspection on your values may lead you to find apparent conflicts: you enjoy doing something, but wish you enjoyed it less, or you don't enjoy it and you wish you did. He provides a notation for talking about this kind of situation which I found kind of clumsy, but the idea of thinking about such things and having a language for analyzing them is valuable. He explains why you might have these conflicts, and why it is valuable to reason about the conflict from a viewpoint that is meta to both. Once you decide which desire is more important, he also shows that it's possible to use that understanding to bring your values into alignment, even when it's the more basic, inbuilt drive that you want to change. (I blogged last year about goals and meta-goals as ends and means).

Stanovich only spends about 20 pages on identifying and defusing opinions and desires that serve to protect your memes from your introspection, but these sections are his most valuable contribution. The memes that set up a self-reinforcing structure that forbid evaluation of the meme-complexes themselves are the ones that most deserve concentrated attention. I think he explains this point well enough that people in the grip of religious (or other defensive) ideas would be able to see how the prohibition on introspection only serves the meme-cluster, which might help them get over the hurdle and start down a reflective epistemological path, and figure out what their own goals are.

Unfortunately, Stanovich ends the book by trying to show that markets subvert the goal of reconciling our desires and meta-desires. His argument is that markets only pay attention to money, and so the people with the most money get what they want and everyone else gets nothing. What this misses is that of all the actually possible social institutions, markets are unique in not giving a few people complete control of the economy. In a market, some people have more money and therefore get to command more resources, but anyone who has some money can still use it to buy some of what they want. The great failing of socialism is that only the politicians get a voice. But this is a minor failing of the book. On the whole, it's nice to see a book that learns from Evolutionary Psychology, and uses those ideas to help people learn how to think about what they want.

Sunday, March 05, 2006

David Buller: Adapting Minds

David Buller's 's Adapting Minds was pretty hard to get through, but the most important ideas seemed to have been covered in the first half. I only got about half-way through before skimming and skipping my way through the rest. I got the impression from the reading group's discussion that more people than usual hadn't finished the book.

Buller's goal is to show that the most well known findings of the Evolutionary Psychology movement (which intends to show that there are facets of human behavior that are evolved and universal) result from misinterpretation of the experimental results, or from improper controls in the experiments. In this, it resembles Judith Miller's The Nurture Assumption, which showed that most of the research intended to determine what traits are genetic based on comparisons of twins raised together or apart misunderstood the nature of the correlations they were looking for, and so used the wrong attributes as controls. Miller's book succeeded in demolishing those results, and put forward alternate explanations along with supporting evidence to show that her characterization worked better than the standard interpretation.

Buller succeeds in showing some flaws in the widely touted results, but doesn't present plausible alternative explanations. In the end, the reader is left with the feeling that EP's results have been nitpicked to death, but has no solid basis for guessing which way the experiments would come out if run again with better controls. On the other hand, since Buller started out by saying that he didn't want to attack the idea that there's an evolved basis for behavior, Buller wouldn't count this as a failure. All he wanted to do was shoot down the specific results of the EP proponents, and not the idea of heritable behavioral traits, or the program of research intended to establish the details.

One particular example that Buller beats to death is the Wason Test, the results of which have been widely interpreted to show that people have an innate cheater detection facility. Buller relies on the argument that the form of the two questions that are asked (if even then red, versus if drinking then must be of age) are different kinds of logical propositions. The most enlightening version of the explanation (he seems to explain at least a dozen times, with references to different experts and scholarly lines of discussion) is that the two cases that supposedly violate the given rules differ structurally. In one case, the consequent is negated ("the card shows red"), in the other, the rule's requirement is not complied with ("the patron is under age").

In the end, it seems clear that the EP crowd's explanation doesn't carry all the force it is commonly purported to. At the same time, it's also clear from introspecting on our difference in performance on the two tasks that we solve one by general reasoning, and the other using a built-in problem solver (it's fast, and the process is introspectively atomic). Even if it is the form of the question that affects the results rather than the subject matter of the question, there's still a difference in performance that matches the EPers' description of a behavioral facility that is inate, specific to humans, and universal among healthy individuals. It's an inherited behavioral trait. The boundaries aren't where the standard explanation puts them, put it's still there.

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